

**REMARKS**

**Claim Rejections Under §103:**

Paragraph 3 of the Action rejects claims 13, 33-43, 49-50, 57-59, 65-66, 76-77, and 83 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Carrier (U.S. Patent 5,195,126) in view of Gregorek (U.S. Patent 5,557,658). Applicant respectfully traverses this rejection for at least the reasons stated below.

In response to a previous rejection of claim 13, Applicant pointed out that Gregorek does not teach associating an advertisement with the destination of a call. The current Action now admits that Gregorek does not teach this feature; however the current Action states that Carrier teaches associating an emergency message with a destination of an incoming communication. Applicant respectfully disagrees.

On page 5, lines 21-22, the description states “. . . the called part is the destination 112 of incoming communication 118.” Thus, in order for Carrier to make up for the deficiencies of Gregorek, Carrier must teach associating an advertisement with the destination, i.e., the party called, of an emergency communication, e.g., a 911 call. Carrier does not teach associating an advertisement with the called party, i.e., the 911 service center. Rather, Carrier expressly states that the processing of the 911 call proceeds as normal (see Col. 4, lines 53-54). Accordingly, Carrier does not teach associating an advertisement with the destination of the incoming communication as required by claim 13.

Carrier does teach that the system, upon receipt of the incoming emergency communication, will also dial other predetermined destinations and play a personal message. But these other destination dialed by the system are not a destination as defined in the present application and claimed in claim 13, because these destination are not the destination of the

incoming communication, which is processed normally. Rather, these destinations are destinations dialed by the system.

Further, the rejection as to claim 13 must fail, because the Action fails to provide a proper motive to combine Carrier with Gregorek. “To establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or suggest all the claim limitations. The teaching or suggestion to make the claimed combination and the reasonable expectation of success must both be found in the prior art and not based on applicant's disclosure. *In re Vaeck*, 947 F.2d 488, 20 USPQ2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991).” See MPEP §706.02(j).

In this instance, the references used to reject claim 13 fail to meet all three of these requirements. First, the Action fails to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, because the references fail to disclose each and every element of claim 13 as described above. In addition, however, the Action fails to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, because the Action fails to provide a proper motivation to combine the two references. In attempting to provide this motivation, the Action states that “[i]t would have been beneficial to be able to productively occupy the time when both the calling and called parties are on the line, and to avoid having both parties listen to a meaningless or annoying busy signal, a ring back signal, or wait idly while one of the parties (sic) station receives another call or processing information.”

This statement fails to provide the proper motivation to combine for several reasons. First, it is inaccurate. While call processing signals may be annoying, they are un-questionably

*not* meaningless. They are in fact necessary to the successful completion of calls as is well understood by one of skill in the art. Their existence and use alone are evidence enough of their necessity and everyone who has used a telephone understands their meaning. Accordingly, the statement that “[i]t would have been beneficial to be able to productively occupy the time when both the calling and called parties are on the line, and to avoid having both parties listen to a meaningless . . .” is inaccurate and cannot be used as the basis of a *prima facie* case of obviousness.

Second, the statement does not provide the substantial evidence based on the references themselves, necessary to support a *prima facie* case of obviousness. As noted above, “[t]he teaching or suggestion to make the claimed combination and the reasonable expectation of success must both be found in the prior art and not based on applicant's disclosure. *In re Vaeck*, 947 F.2d 488, 20 USPQ2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991).” See MPEP §706.02(j). Further, each finding of fact upon which a conclusion of obviousness is based must be supported by substantial evidence and, in particular the conclusion that the prior art suggests or motivates the modification of a prior art reference must be based on findings supported by substantial evidence. *In re Kotzab*, 217 F. 3d 1365, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Hence, a *prima facie* case of obviousness cannot be made out by merely asserting that modifications to the prior art are “well within the ordinary skill of the art.” *Ex Parte Leavengood*, 28 USPQ2d 1300 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1993).

Accordingly, Applicant asserts that the Action fails to make out a *prima facie* case of obviousness, because it fails to provide the substantial evidence in support of the conclusion that *the cited references* teach a motivation to modify the teachings of Carrier with the teachings of Gregorek. Or stated another way, the statement “[i]t would have been beneficial to be able to

productively occupy the time when both the calling and called parties are on the line, and to avoid having both parties listen to a meaningless . . .” is not based on the references being cited and appears at best to be based on hindsight gleaned from the teachings of the present application.

Accordingly, Applicant respectfully request withdrawal of the rejection as to claim 13, because Carrier and Gregorek, alone or in combination, fail to render claim 13 unpatentable. Further, Applicant respectfully request withdrawal of the rejection as to claims 33-43, 49-50, 57-59, and 65-66 because they depend from claim 13 which is itself allowable over the art of record.

Applicant respectfully requests withdrawal of the rejection as to claim 34 for the additional reason that Carrier and Gregork, alone or in combination, fail to teach, suggest, or disclose replacing the rings of the ring back signal with short advertisements. In a previous Action, claim 34 was rejected based on Gregorek. Applicant pointed out, however, that Gregorek failed to teach this limitation.

Specifically Applicant pointed out that Gregorek teaches replacing the entire ringback signal with one continuous message that is 5 – 30 seconds long (see Col. 11, lines 18-25). This is not the same as replacing the individual rings of the ringback signal with a short advertisement as described in the present application (see page 8, lines 7-9) and claimed in claim 34. As explained in the present application, a ringback signal comprises a plurality of short rings (see page 8, lines 7-9). It should be well understood that these rings are very short, i.e., a fraction of a second. Thus, unlike Gregorek, the present application teaches that very short advertisements can be used in place of the rings of the ringback signal. As noted in the present application, this is different than replacing the entire ringback signal with a continuous advertisement (see page 8, lines 27-30).

The present Action puts forth no new grounds for rejecting claim 34. In particular, the Action does not assert that Carrier teaches the additional limitations of claim 34. Accordingly, Applicant asserts that claim 34 is allowable over the art of record for the reasons stated previously and restated above. Applicant therefore respectfully requests withdrawal of the rejection as to claim 34 for at least this additional reason.

In addition, Applicant respectfully requests withdrawal of the rejection as to claims 37 and 58 for the additional reason that the Action fails to present a *prima facie* case of obviousness as to the additional limitations found in these claims. As previously stated, in order to support a *prima facie* case of obviousness, the references must teach each and every element as well as a motivation to combine the references. Claims 37 and 58 require that the “. . . advertisement associated with the destination . . . be routed to the destination when the destination goes off hook in response to the incoming communication.” Thus, in order to support a *prima facie* case of obviousness, the references, alone or in combination, must teach this limitation.

The Action admits that Carrier does not teach this limitation; therefore, Carrier alone cannot render the claims unpatentable. Thus, in order to support a *prima facie* case of obviousness, Gregorek must teach this limitation; however, as applicant pointed out in Applicants previous response, Gregorek does not teach associating an advertisement with the destination. The present Action does not argue this point, but rather cites Carrier for teaching associating an advertisement with the destination. Accordingly, Gregorek admittedly does not teach associating an advertisement with the destination and cannot therefore teach that the “. . . advertisement associated with the destination . . . be routed to the destination when the destination goes off hook in response to the incoming communication.” Gregorek cannot, therefore, make up for the deficiencies of Carrier in this respect.

Accordingly, the Action fails to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness regarding claims 37 and 58, because the references cited fail to teach each and every element of claims 37 and 58. Moreover, the Action fails to provide the necessary motivation to combine the references required to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness. First, neither reference teaches the addition limitations of claims 37 and 58, therefore they cannot possibly provide a motivation to combine the two references in order to achieve limitations that are not contained in either reference. Second, the statement that “[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify Carrier’s emergency alert system to alert or route advertisements information when the destination goes off hook in order to have two ways (sic) routing advertisement system,” fails to make out a *prima facie* case of obviousness, because it fails to provide the substantial evidence in support of the conclusion that *the cited references* teach a motivation to modify the teachings of Carrier with the teachings of Gregorek and appears at best to be based on hindsight gleaned from the teachings of the present application.

Applicant therefore respectfully requests withdrawal of the rejection as to claims 37 and 58 for at least these additional reasons.

Applicant respectfully requests withdrawal of the rejection as to claim 38 for the additional reason that Carrier and Gregork, alone or in combination, fail to teach, suggest, or disclose causing “. . . the advertisement associated with the source to be routed to the source when the advertisement associated with the destination is routed to the destination.” The Action merely states that Gregorek “teaches the advertisement associated with the source to be routed to the source.” But this statement is clearly insufficient to establish that either Carrier or Gregorek, alone or in combination, teach, suggest or disclose “. . . the advertisement associated with the

source to be routed to the source when the advertisement associated with the destination is routed to the destination.”

Applicant asserts that neither reference teaches this limitation nor can the references support a *prima facie* case of obviousness for reasons similar to those asserted above with respect to claims 37 and 58. Applicant therefore respectfully requests withdrawal of the rejection as to claim 38 for at least these additional reasons.

Applicant respectfully requests withdrawal of the rejection as to claims 50 and 66 for the additional reason that Carrier and Gregork, alone or in combination, fail to teach, suggest, or disclose that “. . . the database is interfaced with the Internet, and wherein the user can access the database to update the user preferences over the Internet.” The Action states that the claims are rejected for the same reasons discussed with respect to claim 31. Claim 31 has been cancelled, so there appears to be no grounds presented for the rejection. In a previous Action, claim 31 was rejected because Gregorek stated that a telephone or “other device” can be used to establish a connection with the switch in order to access the system; however, Gregorek makes no reference to the Internet, nor does Carrier. Applicant therefore respectfully requests withdrawal of the rejection as to claims 50 and 66 for at least these additional reasons.

With respect to claims 76 and 83, the Action states that these claims are rejected for the same reasons discussed with respect to claims 13, 34, and 57. Accordingly, Applicant asserts that claims 76 and 83 are allowable for at least the reasons stated above with respect to claims 13, 34, and 57. Specifically, Applicant reiterates that neither Carrier or Gregorek teach, suggest, or disclose replacing the ring tones of the ring back signal with short advertisements. Accordingly, neither Carrier nor Gregorek, alone or in combination, can render claims 76 and 83 unpatentable. Accordingly, Applicant respectfully request withdrawal of the rejection as to

claims 76 and 83. Further, Applicant respectfully request withdrawal of the rejection as to claim 77 because it depends from claim 76, which is itself allowable over the art of record.

Paragraph 4 of the Action rejects claims 44-48, 60-64, and 78-82 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Carrier (U.S. Patent 5,195,126) in view of Gregorek (U.S. Patent 5,557,658). Claims 44-48, 60-64, and 78-82 ultimately depend from claims 13 and 76, which are allowable for at least the reasons stated above. Therefore, claims 44-48, 60-64, and 78-82 are allowable for at least these same reason unless Kung can make up for the deficiencies of Carrier and Gregorek, which it cannot. Applicant therefore respectfully request withdrawal of the rejection as to claims 44-48, 60-64, and 78-82 because they are allowable for at least the reasons stated above with respect to claims 13 and 76.

In paragraph 5, the Action addresses Applicant's previous argument that Gregorek does not teach replacing the ring tones of the ring back signal with short advertisement, but rather that Gregorek teaches replacing the entire ring back signal with one long message that is 5-30 seconds long. This argument is relevant to claims 34, 76, and 83 and any claims that depend therefrom. The Action does not attempt to refute this position, but rather states that "[t]his is irrelevant to the claimed invention." Applicant must respectfully disagree.

First, as noted, the limitations at issue are expressly contained in three separate claims, two of which (claims 76 and 83) are independent claims. Thus, Applicant does not understand how the Action can state that these limitations are irrelevant, since this is clearly not the case. The limitations are quite relevant.

Second, it is an unquestioned tenant of patent law that in order for a reference to render a claim unpatentable, it must teach each and every element of the invention as claimed. Moreover, "the identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as contained in the . . . claim." (*See*



MPEP §2131, citing *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Thus, in order to render claims 34, 76 and 83 unpatentable, either Gregorek or Carrier, alone or in combination, must teach that the rings of the ring back signal are replaced with short advertisements.


Applicant asserts that Carrier does not teach this limitation, and the Action makes no assertion to the contrary. Applicant has previously asserted that Gregorek does not teach this limitation. The above statement does not refute this position, but rather tries to overcome it by stating that it is not relevant to the claimed inventions, which again is clearly not the case. Accordingly, Applicant asserts that the statement of paragraph 5 admits that this limitation is not met by Gregorek, but attempts to provide an improper basis for an anticipation or obviousness rejection. Because the statement is not a proper basis to rejection the claims as being anticipated or obvious, and for the reasons stated above, Applicant asserts that Carrier and Gregorek alone or in combination, cannot render claims 34, 76 and 83 unpatentable. Applicant, therefore, respectfully asserts that claims 34, 76, 83, and any claims that depend therefrom are allowable over the art of record.

**CONCLUSION**

Applicant believes that given the above amendments and remarks, the claims are now in condition for allowance and such is respectfully requested. No new claim fees are believed to be necessitated by this response. The Examiner is requested to charge any additional fees that may be due with this response to deposit account 13-048.

Respectfully submitted,

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